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Dissaving After Retirement:
Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine several aspects of saving and dissaving
after retirement. First, we argue that existing evidence on bequeathable
age—wealth profiles is suspect, and provide new evidence based on
longitudinal data indicating that significant dissaving may occur,
particularly among single individuals and early retirees. Second, we argue
that, in the presence of annuities, estimates of dissaving should be
adjusted by including the simple discounted value of benefits in total
wealth. Such adjustments reveal relatively little dissaving among any group
of retirees. Finally, we test the pure life cycle hypothesis by observing
the behavioral response of rates of accumulation to involuntary







Does wealth typically decline after retirement? Despite imich
recent research, this deceptively simple question has remained contro-
versial. Previous investigators seem evenly divided on the issue of
whether elderly individuals save or dissave, and no consensus about
magnitudes has emerged even among those who agree on the direction of
change.
There is as well widespread disagreement about the reasons for
asking this question. Some (notably Mirer 119791) have argued that the
life cycle hrpothesis is inconsistent with rising or slowly declining
wealth after retirement. Others (such as Davies [19811) have recognized
that, in view of uncertainty concerning lifespans, one cannot base a
formal test of the life cycle hypothesis on this information alone.
Such authors have, however, suggested that one could conduct an informal
"test" by comparing empirical data with the results of simulations based
upon plausible parameters values. Finally, one might altogether abandon
the hope of inferring motives from information about the age—wealth
profile, and instead simply treat such information as valuable per Se.
If, for example, wealth fails to decline rapidly after retirement,
intergenerational transfers are likely to be significant. Regardless of
motives, this will have strong implications concerning the long run
distribution of wealth (see, for example, Loury [1981] and Stiglitz
[19781)—2—
The appropriate definition of "wealth" will depend critically upon
which of these purposes one has in mind. Information on bequeathable
wealth—ageprofiles is by itself sufficient for drawing inferences about
the magnitude of bequests. However, tests of the life cycle hypothesis
mustnecessarily consider all forms of resources, including annuities
(Social Security and pensions). It is therefore somewhat surprising
that, with few exceptions (King and Dicks—Mireaux [1982, 19831, Hurd and
Shoven [19831), studies of the age—wealth profile ignore annuities. Nor
have any of these authors provided a theoretical discussion of how
calculated rates of dissaving should be adjusted in the presence of
annuities.
Accordingly, this paper has three objectives. First, we present
new evidence on the relationship between age and bequeathable wealth
holdings after retirement. While previous studies employ either cross—
sectional survey or estate data, our approach is to follow a sample of
retired individuals over time. We argue that this methodology is likely
to produce superior estimates of dissaving after retirement. We find
that bequeathable wealth declines relatively rapidly for single indivi-
duals (roughly 3 to It% per year), while for couples, the evidence is
mixed (slight declines, on the order of 1 to 2% per year, are observed
for early retirees; otherwise, bequeathable wealth remains relatively
constant after retirement). Changes in the composition of bequeathable
wealth (specifically, the fraction held as residential housing) are also
analyzed.—3—
Oursecond objective is to develop and implement a technique for
calculating meaningful rates of resource depletion when some positive
fraction of wealth is held as annuities. Since survival probabilities
decline with age, the use of actuarial values (as in King and Dicks—
Mireaux l982, 1983]) builds in a tendency for total wealth to decline
quite rapidly after retirement. However, we argue that actuarial
discounting is inappropriate for calculating meaningful rates of deple-
tion. Instead, we show that simple discounting of benefit streams is
(approximately) appropriate whenever behavior is governed by traditional
life cycle concerns. Thus we find, contrary to King and Dicks—Mireaux,
that, after adjusting for annuities, neither single individuals nor
couples dissave significant fractions of their total resources after
retirement.
Of course, this is not a formal test of the life cycle maximiza-
tion principal. Our third objective is to construct such a test using
information on the age—wealth profile. We show that the life cycle
model has strong implications about how rates of accumulation and deple-
tion will respond to the imposition of non—discretionary annuities..!.'
Implementation of these tests produces results which are unfavorable to
the pure life cycle bpothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
describe the data source which is employed throughout. A discussion of
the existing literature on bequeathable wealth—age profiles appears in
section 3, along with our new estimates. Theoretical foundations for
the valuation of annuity wealth are discussed in section I, and adjusted—'4—
estimatesof accumulation and depletion are presented. Section 5
describes and implements a test of the life cycle hypothesis based on
the behavioral response of changes in wealth to involuntary annuitiza—
tion. The paper closes with a brief conclusion.
2. The Data
This study employs data from the Longitudinal Retirement History
Survey (LRHS), which followed a sample of over 11,000 retirement—aged
individuals (58 to 63 in 1968) for a period of ten years, starting in
1969. Some information was also obtained from matching administrative
records.
The LRHS collected extensive information on the net worth of
respondents. Our measure of bequeathable wealth includes the value of
owner occupied housing (net of mortgage liabilities), equity in a
business or farm, the net value of other property holdings, cash, and
financial assets (including stocks, bonds, bank accounts, checking
accounts, and money loaned to other), minus total household debt
(excluding mortgage items already counted)..V
While extensive in coverage, there is reason to believe that
wealth data contained in the LRHS are not of high quality. In general,
it is difficult to elicit accurate information about net worth in inter—
view SUVy5. A casual inspection of LRHS records indicates sub—
stantial misreporting of assets.J Deleting observations for which any
component of wealth was incorrectly reported would drastically reduce
the sample size, as well as induce a bias of unknown direction. Due to—5—
the relative magnitude of housing in the portfolios of most elderly
individuals, we did insist that the completion code associated with this
item indicated an unambiguous value. This probably biases our sample
somewhat towards renters,.J although the statistics presented in section
3 suggest that this bias is not large. Throughout the paper, it is
important to bear in mind that wealth is poorly reported; we will return
to this issue at various points.
Our study also requires extensive information on pensions and
annuities. Private and government pension benefits are inferred from
income data reported during the sample period. Fortunately, it is
possible to distinguish one—shot, lump sum payments from annuities on
the basis of recorded responses. For individuals retiring late, bene-
fits from such pensions may commence after 1979 (the youngest respondent
is 68 in that year), in which case no income is reported. For such
individuals, we supplement income data with survey responses to ques-
tions concerning expected levels of future benefits. However, one
should bear in mind that private pensions in particular are probably
under—reported for late retirees.
Social Security benefits for each year were calculated on the
basis of prevailing legislation in that year, using data on covered
earnings obtained through matching administrative records. Benefits
were calculated on the basis of actual retirement dates for respondent
and spouse. For the purpose of this calculation, we assumed that all
individuals still working in 1979 retired at the end of that year.—6—
Thematching administrative records were also used to calculate a
measure of lifetime resources for each respondent. Unfortunately, this
information is incomplete, since yearly earnings are only reported up to
the taxable maximum. Since the records also indicate the quarter in
which the taxable maximum was reached, we were able to extrapolate
yearly earnings using the method described by Fox [19161. The resulting
income stream was then accumulated at a 3% rate to a standard age, pro-
ducing a mesure of lifetime earnings.
Much of our analysis also requires us to know whether a particular
individual is retired. Defining retirement is problematic. To reduce
contamination arising from the presence of earned income, we created a
relatively pristine sample of retirees. Thus, "retirees" report them-
selves as fully retired in both the retirement year and all successive
years, and they report negligible earned income during thisperiod..i
A retired couple consists of two retired members, while a working couple
need only have one worker.
In the following sections, our analysis focuses on the behavior of
four samples. To minimize the effects of short run fluctuations, it
seemed desirable to look at changes in wealth over relatively long
periods. Since the 1973 wave of the LRHS collected very incomplete data
on asset holdings, we chose to compare the behavior of retirees and
workers over the periods 1969 to 1975, and 1975 to 1979. For the first
period, we constructed a sample of households who were retired as of
1969, and deleted all observations which had either dissappeared by 1975
(due to death or attrition), or for which household composition hadchanged (due to divorce, separation, or death). Similarly, we con—
structed a sample of households which still included working members as
of 1975, and used these as a basis of comparison.i' Note that our
households are pre—selected on the basis of "survival", and presumably
over—represent healthy individuals. This probably biases our estimate
of asset decumulation down a bit relative to the correct number for the
entire population, but should not affect the comparison of workers and
retirees. The second period (1915 to 1979) received identical treat—
ment. Our basic samples consisted of 574 households retired by 1969
(270 single individuals, 5014 couples), 1360 households still working in
1975 (2140 single individuals, 1120 couples), 10147 households retired by
1975 (173 single individuals, 8614 couples), and 1497 households still
working in 1979 (96 singles, 411 couples).
Finally, all variables have been deflated to 1975 dollars. This,
of course, affects the interpretation of magnitudes reported in the
following sections.
3. Bequeathable Wealth
Although information about the bequeathable wealth-age profile
does not by itself allow us to discuss the plausibility of life cycle
motives, it is nevertheless of significant independent interest. In
this section, we review the existing literature on dissaving among the
elderly, arguing that previous studies suffer from significant biases.
New estimates of dissaving from bequeathable wealth are then presented.—8—
A.Previous Studies
Three different types of data sources have been used to estimate
the extent of dissavirig during retirement. These are:(1) interview
surveys of saving among the aged, (2) cross—section interview surveys of
net worth, and (3) estate data. We consider these in turn.
Typically, data from interview surveys of saving amongtheaged
(Lydall 119551, Projector [1968], and Mulanaphy [197141) have found posi-
tive, or only slightly negative rates of accumulation. These findings
can be criticized on several grounds. First, savings are defined by-
observable transactions. Thus, all capital gains and losses (including
those induced by inflation) are ommitted. Second, the data are highly
aggregated. Both Projector and Lrdall group all aged individuals (those
over 65) together in a single category. Undoubtably, many of these are
still working, perhaps saving at a rapid rate in anticipation of retire—
inent. This problem is compounded by the fact that meanvaluesare
reported——a small (perhaps wealthy) fraction of the sample saving large
amounts may, in such as a calculation, dominate the dissaving of a much
larger fraction. Thus, the percentage of retirees dissaving at reason-
ably rapid rates may be much larger than these numbers would suggest.
A number of investigators, including Lydall [19551, Projector and
Weiss [19661, Smith [1975], Mirer [1979], and King and Dicks—Mireaux
[1982] have attempted to infer the bequeathable wealth—age profile from
cross—section interview surveys of net worth. With the exception of
King and Dicks—Mireaux, these studies confirm the findings reported
above. However, this approach encounters a variety of difficulties.—9—
First, none of these studies distinguish between workers and
retirees. Physical assets understate the total wealth (human and non-
human) available to non—retired individuals. Since the proportion of
fully retired individuals in a cohort rises with the age of that cohort,
this builds in a spurious positive correlation between observed wealth
and age..J
To illustrate the potential significance of this affect, we
regressed total bequeathable wealth on age and lifetime resources for
four subsamples (all single individuals, retired single individuals, all
couples, and retired couples), using cross—section data from the 1975
wave of the LRHS. We chose the 1975 wave for two reasons: (1) in 1975,
aged of respondent ranges from 61 to 69, which facilitates comparison
with other studies,.2J and (2) in 1969, there was very little spread in
age of retirement due to the comparative youth of the sampie..12J Our
results are presented in Table i.!!J Point estimates for the entire
sample are roughly consistent with previous studies. However, when
current workers are excluded, significant dissaving is observed for both
single individuals and couples (note, however, that the coefficient is
not statistically significant for couples).
Unfortunately, restricting attention to retired individuals within
a cross—section induces a sample selection bias. Suppose we know that
an individual of age A is retired, but we have not observed his date
of retirement. It is straightforward to show that his expected age of
retirement is increasing in A.!V Thus, all else equal, we would expect
older members of a cross—section to have retired later. Differences in—10—
age therefore overstate differences in years of retirement(time spent
dissaving). This suggests that our estimates understate the true magni-
tude of dissaving.
A second difficulty encountered by studies employing cross—section
interview surveys of net worth is that such surveys implicitly incor-
porate an important sample selection criterion: only surviving members
of a particular cohort are represented. Ex ante, survivors are, on a
average, healthier. Thus, as a cohort ages, the survivors will repre-
sent an increasingly healthy (in a lifetime sense) fraction of the
original sampie.iJ This induces a correlation between age and lifetime
health in cross—sections..i!i Healthier individuals in turn tend to
accumulate more wealth to provide for longer retirement periods. As a
result, a spurious positive correlation between wealth and age may be
observed.
Third, with the exception of King and Dicks—Mireaux, studies
employing cross—section surveys of net worth fail to control for life-
time resources. Since wealthier people tend to live longer, older
members of any cross—section will, on average, have higher lifetime
resources. This problem is compounded by the secular decline in retire-
ment age (older individuals spent more years in the labor force). Rising
productivity generates an offsetting "cohort effect"——on average, older
members of any cross—section will have worked during periods of lower
wages. The net effect is ambiguous; age may be positively or negatively
correlated with age in cross_section..iJ—11—
King and Dicks—Mireaux recognize the importance of controlling for
lifetime earnings, and employ the ratio of net worth to "permanent
income" as their dependent variable. While an improvement over previous
techniques, this fails to correct properly for the first two sources of
bias mentioned in the preceeding paragraph. Most obviously, since
permanent income is a yearly figure, no adjustment is made for length of
working life. In addition, this variable.is constructed in a manner
which fails to adjust for the correlation between wealth and survival
probabilities. Specifically, permanent income is inferred from a cross—
section regression explaining current earnings. Since retired individ-
uals have no current earnings, the estimates are driven by the earnings
of younger (and therefore, since the cohort efrect is corrected for,
lifetime poorer) individuals. This builds in a tendency to underpredict
the permanent income of elderly individuals, or equivalently to under-
state the extent of dissaving.
Finally, we consider studies based on estate data. Since Atkinson
[19111, Atkinson and Harrison [1978], and l3rittain [1978] use this data
to generate cross—section estimates of the age—wealth relation, their
analyses suffer from the problems described above. In fact, different
sample selection criteria imply that, in some cases, the bias will be
much worse. For example, information on young individuals is observed
only if those individuals die young. Since early death is highly
correlated with poor health, there will be a strong correlation between
age and lifetimehealth insuch samples. In addition,estate data is
heavilytruncated, providing no information on a very large number of—12—
individuals who die with relatively little net worth. In effect, any
individual who dissaves too rapidly is automatically excluded from these
samples.
Shorrocks [197'5] used a somewhat different approach, estimating
the age—wealth relationship from estate data by following a particular
cohort over time. While he corrects for potential biases based upon the
correlation between wealth and survival probabilities, he does not
adjust for the effects of attrition (individuals who dissave suffic-
iently never show up in estate data), and therefore understates the rate
of resource depletion.
While most of these studies have focused on the relationship
between total bequeathable wealth and age, some have also investigated
changes in portfolio composition among the elderly. One question of
particular interest is how the percentage of net worth held as owner
occupied housing changes with age. Attempts to infer an answer to this
question based upon cross—section data are fraught with the difficulties
mentioned above. Portfolio composition may, for example, be related to
total lifetime resources, which is correlated with age in cross—sections
(see above). It is therefore not surprising that various studies, such
as Mirer and King and Dicks—Mireaux, have reached very different conclu-
sions
B. New Estimates
Since most objections to analyses of cross—section data are based
on the premise that individuals at one age are systematically different
from individuals at another age, one possible solution is to follow the—13—
same individuals over time, observing changes in their net worth. Thus,
Mirer concludes thatlongitudinaldata from retirement to death would be
"ideal" for determining wealth holding profiles.!L' Diamond andHausman
[1980] have previously employed the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS,
or Fames data) to study individual savings behavior, in part generating
an estimate of asset decumulation after retirement. Like the LRHS, the
NLS followed a sample of households for a.period of ten years; however,
NLS respondents are, on average, much younger.-iJ Thus, Diamond and
Hausman's estimates of decumulation are based on a relatively small,!2J
and perhaps atypicaJ.J sample of retirees. With the completion and
availability of the LRHS, it is now possible to supplement the existing
literature with new estimates based on more complete longitudinal data
for the early retirement period. Our first objective is to provide this
evidence.
While the use of panel data does allow us to overcome a variety of
dit'ficulities encountered by other approaches, it also raises a new set
of problems. First, estimates are very sensitive to macroeconomic events.
For example, in a period of supra (sub) normal stock market returns,
respondents may experience significant unanticipated accumulation
(depletion) of net worth (more on this below). The data, however,
provide no way of distinguishing motives. It is worth noting that
analyses of cross—section data encounter a similar difficulty, since
different cohorts have encountered systematically different patterns of
unanticipated gains and losses over the life cycle. Within the current
context, we can partially correct for this effect by examining evidence—1 1—
based upon macroeconomically distinct time periods (specifically, we use
1969 through 1975, and 1975 through 1979). In addition, we can, for
each period, isolate the net effect of retirement on accumulation by
contrasting the behavior of retirees and workers.
A second problem concerns sample selection. For each period, our
analysis is confined to households who "survived" the entire period.
Presumably, this implies that our data over—represent healthy, wealthy,
and domestically stable households. In addition, our requirement that
households be retired at the beginning of the period, combined with the
relative youth of respondents, implies that the sample is skewed towards
early retirees..J It is critical to realize, however, that although our
sample may be somewhat atypical relative to the entire population,.?.J
there is no reason to believe that our selection criteria bias estimates
of dissaving for this group. The great advantage of panel data is that,
by following the same households over time, we can hold exogenous
factors (however selected) constant. In contrast, for cross—sections,
dissaving is inferred from differences in the net worth of households of
different ages, who are implicitly selected according to different cri-
teria. We conclude that panel data, while not perfect, provides a
superior source of evidence on asset accumulation.
We begin by inspecting the time pattern of mean bequeathable
wealth for each of our subgroups. Results are presented in Table 2...J
Between 1969 and 1975, net worth declines by 21.1% ($3176) for retired
individuals, and 22.8% ($7923) for retired couples. In the later period
(1975 to 1979), it declines by 6.8%($1393)for retired individuals, and—15—
rises by 14.1% ($21466) for retired couples. These figures are consistent
with a 3to14% yearly decline during the first period, and either a 2%
yearly decline or 1% yearly rise in the second period. It is difficult
to determine whether differences between periods are attributable to
sample differences (early vs late retirees), or to changing macro-
economic circumstances.
It is noteworthy that, for each subgroup of working households,
net worth always moves in the same direction as it does for the corres-
ponding retired subgroup. In fact, it falls for all groups, except for
couples between 1975 and l99. This by itself is not surprising; hump—
shaped income profiles may cause wealth to begin its decline prior to
retirement. King and Dicks—Mireaux also find some evidence of dissaving
within the pre—retirement group. However, since income falls discontin-
uously at retirement, the life cycle hypothesis at minimum predicts that
the rate of accumulation (depletion) should fall (rise) at that time..J
Is this prediction consistent with the data?
For single individuals, there is very little difference in either
period between the absolute dollar value dissaved by retirees and
workers. However, since early retirees tend to be relatively poor, dif-
ferences between rates of dissaving are substantial (mean net worth of
workers fell 9.14% between 1969 and 1915, and 2.3% between 1915 and
1919). For couples, differences between both rates of change and abso-
lute dollar values dissaved were siibstantial..J In interpreting thesenumbers, it is important to recall that the subgroups are based on dif-
ferent sample selection criteria, and differences may therefore reflect
heterogenous behavioral propensities.
One puzzling aspect of Table 2 is the precipitous decline between
1969 and 1975 in the net worth of both single individuals and couples
still working in 1979. During this period, mean dissaving of households
retiring in the more distant future exceeded that of any other groups.
This observation seems inconsistent with life—cycle behavior; we will
return to it at various point.
For a number of reasons, we are dissatisfied with estimates of
accumulation and depletion based on mean values of net worth. Most
importantly, these estimates will be heavily influenced by the poten-
tially atypical behavior of households with high initial wealth.
Suppose, for example, that the behavior of households i is given byEJ
wt,i
=
whereW is bequeathable wealth in period t. Our estimate of the






That is, is a weighted average of thei's, where the largest
weights are accorded to individuals with high initial wealth. Such
indis,iduals may, for example, be atypically acquisitive, leading to a
high estimated value of .
Arelated problem concerns measurement error. Suppose that
has a common value, ,forall households, so that true wealth
evolves according to
(2) =
Assumeas well that wealth is observed with error:
(3) w .=W*.c
t,it,i t,].
whereE(e .)=1,and .isindependent of W .andc for
t,]. t,i t,i t,j








isa consistent estimator of .However,since it is a ratio of
stochastic terms, its small sample properties are suspect. In particular,
observations with a high value of c11 (and therefore a lower value
of .)willreceive greater weight (w 1 will be 1 t— ,1 ——18—
higher). We would therefore expect our estimate of to be biased
downwards, towards high dissaving.
These considerations suggest that we should accord equal weight to
the dissaving rate of each household. One alternative is to calculate




(whereN is the number of observations). When wealth is observed with
error, this technique will produce inconsistent estimates of .In




which generally exceeds .Thedifficulty again arises from the
appearance of a stochastic term in the denominator.
We suggest the following procedure. Equation (1) can be written
as
log =log
Substituting (2), we see that
log Wt,1/Wt_i,1 =log+logc_1, —log6t,i
If the nasurement error terms are, for example, independentJ and log
normal, then the mean observed log rate of accumulation is an unbiased—19—
estimator of the log of 3. With population heterogeneity, this proce-
dure produces an unbiased estimate of the mean of log .,butit is
not possible to recover the population mean of itself. However, if
the 's are reasonably close together (we might expect them to be
near unity), the mean of the logs will not be far from the log of the
mean.
The problem with the procedure is that it requires us to drop all
households for which measured wealth was non—positive in either period
t or period t —1.It is important to examine the resulting sample
selection bias. If the sample is heterogeneous, the procedure excludes
all obserrations for whom =0or .Inaddition, if the probabil-
ity of falsely reporting 0 falls with wealth, then our estimate of the
mean of log .willbe biased upwards..2J
To determine the potential significance of this effect, we exam-
ined the frequency of movements to and from non—positive levels of
bequeathable wealth. Our findings are summarized in the second part of
Table 2. For most groups (especially couples), the percentage reporting
zero wealth was relatively low. Moreover, net movements between posi-
tive and non—positive wealth levels are typically quite small (on the
order of 1 or 2%), with three exceptions. 6% (net) of retired single
individuals moved from positive to nonpositive wealth between 1969 and
1975, and did 15% of retired couples. During the same period, 8% of
single individuals who would retire by 1975 moved in the opposite direc-
tion. Thus, we observe some tendency for early retirees to completely
exhaust their accumulated resources quickly after retirement. We also—20—
observe a significant fraction of single individuals accumulating appre-
ciable resources only immeditely prior to retirement.
There is, however, much noise in this data. While net movements
between positive and non—positive wealth levels are typically small, the
total fraction of households moving in one direction or the other is
quite large. To see this, note (in Table 2) that the percentage of
households reporting positive resources in two consecutive sample years
is substantially smaller than the fraction reporting positive resources
in either of those two years alone.
Table 3 presents sample statistics on log W75/W69 and log WT9/W75
for each of our subgroups. Recognizing the conceptual difficulties
generated by the sample selection bias described above, we have listed
medians, as well as the fraction of each subsample for which bequeath—
able wealth declines during the period of observation. If inclusion of
observations with zero wealth is desired, it is possible to adjust
fractile statistics using the percentage movements to and from zero
wealth reorted in Table 2.
The results are quite striking, and differ enormously from those
based on wealth levels. The mean log rates of accumulation indicate
statistically significant dissaving for every retired group, except
couples from 19T5 to 1979. Positive saving among this group may be an
artifact of the precipitous, and probably unanticipated rise in housing
prices during the late seventies, combined with relatively widespread
home ownership (see statistics below). In contrast, no dissaving is
indicated in any currently working group, and in many such cases the—21—
estimatedsaving rates arestatisticallysignificant. Note that the
"puzzl&' of significant dissaving before retirement among late retirees
no longer appears. Medians reveal a similar pattern, the only
discrepancy in sign arising cdth respect to single individuals still
workingin 1919, during the first sample period. Adjustment of medians
formovement to and from non-positive wealth would not alter this
pattern.
Ratesof dissaving for retired single individuals are evidently
quite high. Calculated means indicated a yearly decline of between 3
and 6%; medians confirm the lower end of this range. In contrast,
couples dissave very little—-perhps 1 or 2% per year in the first period
(early retirees), and not at all in the second period (although medians
indicate that wealth may have risen by as much as 2% per year, the
reader should bear in mind the above qualification concerning housing
price inflation). The discrepancy between the behavior of single
individuals and couples should not be surprising, since couples must
provide for the possibility that either member survives for a long
time. In addition, it may account for the diversity of previous
estimates: Mirer studies couples, while King and Dicks—Mireaux include
single individuals.
It is worth noting that saving is observed for a significant
fraction (over )-o%) of all retired samples, and that dissaving is
observed for a significant fraction (over one third) of all non—retired
samples. While this phenomenon may reflect heterogeneity of behavior,—22—
we are inclined to attribute it primarily to the aparent extent of
measurement error.
Only our highest estimates of depletion rates are roughly
consistent with the 6.8%figureobtained by Diamond and Hausman. We
attribute the magnitude of their estimate to the unrepresentative
characteristics of their sample. As mentioned earlier, NLS households
are, on average, substantially younger than LRHS households.
Individuals retiring during the NLS sample period will, by and large, be
early retirees; our results indicate that early retirees tend to over—
represent single individua1s,.2J and we have seen that single individuals
deplete resources more rapidly than couples. In light of our findings,
it would seem unwise to conclude on the basis of their study that
typical married retirees dissave significant portions of their wealth.
We now examine the evolution of portfolio composition after
retirement. Table 4decomposesbequeathable wealth into four
categories: owner occupied housing, business and property, financial
assets, and debt (other than mortgages). The last of these categories
is insignificant. The extent of homeownership (fraction owner—occu-
pants) is also indicated.
For both single individuals and couples retired by 1969, there is
a decline in every significant asset category except housing. The data
indicate a slight increase in homeownership for retired individuals
during this period, and a slight decline for retired couples.
The behavior of households which were retired by l9T5 is more
interesting. More or less simultaneously with retirement (1969 to—23—
1975), both single individuals and couples liquidated large amounts of
business and property wealth. At the same time, holdings of financial
assets rose slightly, while large gains in housing wealth (especially in
frequency of home ownership) were registered. This raises the possibil-
ity that households liquidated business and property holdings to finance
purchases of homesJJj During the post—retirement period, there is a
slight dip in homeowriership for both groups. Evidently, while many
households purchase homes at retirement, a smaller but significant
number sells homes within a few years subsequent to retirement.
The evidence also appears to indicate that a reasonably stable
(perhaps slightly increasing) fraction of bequeathable wealth is held as
o\mer—occuppied housing during retirement. This confirms the finding of
King and Dicks—Mireaux, contradicting that of Mirer. However, we should
emphasize that these data only concern the early retirement period.
4•Annuities
A very large fraction of the total resources available to many
retired individuals is locked into annuities (government and priv-ate
pensions, Social Security). Studies which ignore this important corn—
ponent of wealth fail to provide sufficient information for judging the
plausibility of life cycle motives.
It has frequently been argued that the inclusion of annuities
would vindicate the hump—shaped wealth—age profile, since the actuarial
value of survival contingent claims falls with age (single year survival
probabilities decline). Thus, Mirer [1979] concedes that, "to some
extent, perhaps a great one for many people, pension and Social Securityprograms tend to institutiohalize the tenets of the life cycle theory."
Likewise, King and Dicks—Mireaux [1983] find evidence of "a clear life—
cycle pattern" when the actuarial value of annuity claims are included
in measures of net worth.
In this section, we argue that actuarial valuation is inappro-
priate if one wishes to infer an age—wealth profile in order to judge
the plausibility of life cycle motives. Elsewhere (Bernheim [1981th]),
we have shown that the simple discounted value of future benefits
(ignoring the possibility of death) is ordinarily a good approximation
to the value (in terms of compensating variation) of an annuity. Here,
we establish that simple discounting is also appropriate within the
current context. Since this measure changes very little with age, our
analysis reverses the conclusions of King and Dicks—Mireaux: the
inclusion of annuities reinforces earlier findings that resources
decline only slightly, if at all, after retirement.
A. Theoretical Considerations
Actuarial valuation of annuities is appropriate under either of
two conditions:(1) households are risk neutral, or (2) households have
access to competitive annuity markets. The first of these conditions is
unreasonably restrictive, and generates absurd behavioral predictions.-i
Under the second condition, there is a very simple test of pure life
cycle motives: do households hold positive levels of bequeathable
wealth at all? In fact, if annuities yeld any return in excess of the
interest rate, pure life cycle consumers will annuitize 100% of their
resources,-' and the notion of dissaving will be vaccuous. Thus, if we—25—
wishto use evidence on rates of dissaving to test the pure life cycle
hypothesis, we must assume a complete absence of annuity markets.IJ
Under the assumptions of missing annuity markets and risk aver-
sion, the value of an annuity will exceed its actuarial value by a risk
premium. Ourcurrenttask is to determine what this observation implies
about the appropriate computation of age—wealth profiles.
We will assume the constant elasticity, intertemporally separable
form of lifetime utility,
l —At c*
(3) —J eCtdt
where A captures the effects of discounting both through the pure rate
of time preference and survival probabilities.J At time 0, the
individual is endowed with some level of bequeathable wealth and
receives some annuity payment A0. Annuity payments grow geometrically
at the rate g; the interest rate is r. Thus, the individuals choice






(5) = ertW0—f(C—A)er(t_T) dt >0.
Ignoring constraint (5)andmaximizing (3) subject to (4),we
obtain the following first order conditions:—26—
(6) Ct=e1tCO
where y Cr — — c)<r. Suppose y >g.Then, continuing to





(8) (w +r_tg) =+ rg)eYt•
Since this program never violates (5), it is optimal.
The interpretation of (7) and (8) is straightforward: consumption
in each period is a constant fraction of total wealth, and total wealth
grows at the geometric rate y. Note, however, that the annuity wealth
term, At/Cr —g),is equal to the siniple discounted value of future
benefits (ignoring death). Thus, to make inferences about y (the life
cycle parameter of interest) from data on the age—wealth profiles, we
should define total wealth to include the simple discounted value of
annuities, not the actuarial value. Intuitively, unless an individual
plans to consume his principal at some point in the future, he will be
indifferent an annuity paying $1 per year, and an asset worth $l/r (both
generatethe same survival contingent income stream).
If <g,the problem is more complex. Ignoring (5),oneagain
obtains (7)and(8),butin this case (5)willbe violated for t—27—
sufficiently large (the individual will wish to borrow on future annuity
benefits). Along the true optimal program, consumption will obeythe
first order condition (6) as long as wealth is positive; however, once
(5) binds, we will simply have C. =At.Let T denote the age at








Finally, it is easy to see that despite the binding constraint,
consumption must be continuous in time, so that
(ii) ec0= gT
A0.
Equations (9), (10), and (ii) together determine C0 and T, from which
the optimal program can be constructed.
In Bernheim [l9814b, we calculated the compensating variation
associated with the marginal annuity for the case of y <g(using
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A — c*g
andestablished that 0 ￿ <1.Intuitively, since (5) may bind at
some point, the annuity is worth less than an asset which yields the
same yearly survival contingent income. As T goes to infinity (or y
to g), this event becomes more remote, so naturally the value of
annuitization approaches A0/(r —g).
Hypotheticalvalues of the proportional adjustment factor (ct)
are given in Bernheim [l98Ib]. For completeness, we reproduce two
samplecalculations here. We assume that r =0.03,g =0,a =0(the
logarithmic case), and A0/(r —g)W0=2(i.e., two thirds of total
resources are held as annuities).i' Since A depends on the rate at
which individuals discount future utility, it is the most difficult
parameter to gauge. We employ values of 0.05 and 0.07.iJ The formula
for y is given above. Substituting (9) into (10), one finds that T
is given by the implicit solution to
W (r —g)
—e(Y_r)T)
r —g— — (g—r)T)=0
r—y A0
Calculated values of y, T, and are pesented in Table 5.
Ignoring non—negativity constraints, wealth would decline by 2 and 14%
per year, for A equal to 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The associated
unconstrained intervals are 142 and 27 years. The marginal annuity is
worth 89%, and 75% of its simple discounted value, respectively.—29—
Employinga "triangle approximation" for the value of inframarginal
units, we find that the associated compensating variations for all
annuity holdings are 914%, and 81% of their simple discounted values. In
contrast, for these parameter values the actuarial discounted value of a
benefitstream is only 31.5% ofits simple discounted vaiue.2J
There is, of course, no reason to believe that itis appropriate
to use the compensating variation as a measure of annuity valuation when
calculating wealth trajectories (except in the limiting case where the
non—negativity constraints never bind). For this reason, we pose the
question somewhat differently. Suppose we employ simple valuation;
i.e., define total resources,
Rt W +At/Cr
—g)
and calculate rates of dissaving from Rt/Ro (i.e., pretend the non—
negativity constraints never bind). How well will our estimated
dissaving parameter,
t&n(Rt/R0)
approximate the parameter of interest Ci)?
Using our characterization of the optimal (constrained) program,
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Table 5 presents values of 4i andr
calculated for our sets of
hypothetical parameter values (where t =6).When A =0.05,p is
0.027, which indicates that understates the "true" rate of dissav—
ing by approximately -/2% per year. Thus, rather than observing a
decline of 2% per year, we should observe "total wealth" falling by
11/2% per year. When A =0.07,g =0.090,which indicates that
understates the true rate of dissaving by 11/2% per year. Thus, "total
wealth" would fall by 2 1/2%, rather than by lt% per year.
These calculations suggest that y' will, for y <g,understate
the rate of dissaving, y. We now prove that this inequality always
holds.
r r
Proposition 1: For yg, y =y.For y <g,y >y.
Proof: The first statement follows trivially from equation (8).
We prove the second claim by showing that p >0.Straightforward cal-
culations reveal that, for y <g,dCO/dAOIR <0P](intuitively,
annuities have a negative income effect since the non—negativity con——31—
straint binds; consumption is therefore depressed). Thus, Rt > R0e1t
(since the right hand side indicates remaining resources in period t
if non—negativity constraints are ignored). Taking t =Tand rear-
ranging, we see that A0e/(r —g)> R0e1T. From equation (13), this
is easily seen to imply that 4'is positive. II
Giventhis result, one possible approach is to adjust l' given an
assumed value of 4', corresponding to some set of reasonable parameter
values. Unfortunately, 4'depends on y, so we cannot estimate y from
without knowing y itself. Another alternative is to obtain a
lower bound on y, in addition to this upper bound.
How might we obtain a lower bound? One suggestion is to calculate
rates of dissaving from W./W0 (as in the preceeding section):
w
tn(Wt/Wü)
To motivate this suggestion, ignore (for the moment) non—negativity con-
straints (equation (5)). Equation (8) will then describe the evolution
of total wealth. Simple manipulations reveal that
At/Cr —g)
(i1) —i(y—g) w t t
Equation (iIi) has an important interpretation. If the individual holds
no annuities, his bequeathable wealth grows at exactly the rate -'.
Supposingas before that 'r<g, as annuities increase, the rate at
which bequeathable wealth declines will acce1erate.I The reason is
straightforward: annuity wealth (At/Cr —g))declines at the rage g;
to preserve a total rate of decline of y, bequeathable wealth niist fall—32—
at an accelerated rate. Thus, as long as-r < g, •1W will overstate the
extent of dissaving. Note that this is completely contrary to the
assertions of earlier authors, who had argued that would under-
state dissaving due to the actuarial decline in annuity wealth.
Of course, the preceeding analysis ignores the non—negativity con-
straints. It is important to verify that our lower bound on y is
valid even when these constraints are considered explicitly. In
particular, we prove:
Proposition 2: Jhen y < g, d(%t/W)/dAo < 0.
Proof: Using the accounting identity
=r+At_ Ct
we see that
d(*/W) ciA dC dW t t t C\ t dA
—tLdA,
' t t / dA
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which is the desired result. II
Of course, if A0 =0, =, sofor '> g,A0 >0implies
<y.It is convenient to summarize this conclusion, as well as much
of the preceeding analysis, in the following proposition.
Proposition 3:
• r w
(i)Ifyg or A0=O,y =1 =1.
r w
(ii)Ify>g and A0>O,y <y•
w r
(iii)If'y<g and A0>O,y <y<y.
Case (iii) is the most interesting, since (for g =0)it con-
cerns a dissaver who holds positive annuities. For such an individual,
depletion of bequeathable wealth will overstate dissaving, while deple-
tion of total wealth (including the simple discounted value of annuity
benefits) will understate it.—3k--
Which of our two measure, or will be closer to y? In
general, the answer depends upon particular parameter values. We can








Suppose g =0.What happens as rises? Ignoring the effect on
p,wesee that W./W0 falls; in fact, it is equal to zero when
ytr i W = eil +< 1.Thus, we would expect yto significantly
understate y when the degree of annuitization is high.
The data presented below indicate that is quite high——roughly
on the order of 2/3 (while others have found mich lower levels of annui—
tization relative to bequeathable wealth, this is due to the use of
actuarial valuation). It is therefore not very surprising that
significantly outperforms y for our hypothetical parameter values.
In Table 5, we calculate values of y, using equation (15). Increasing
annuitization from zero to two—thirds of total resources accelerates the
rate of bequeathable wealth depletion from 2% to 5.2% per year for
A =0.05,and from )4% to9.3% for A =0.07.In both cases, the true
r . valueof y is much closer to our upper bound, y .Byincorporating
date on annuuities, we might therefore hope to learn much more about the
implied behavioral rate of dissaving.—35—
B.Analysis of the Data
In implementing the ideas described above, we encounter two con-
ceptual difficulties. The first concerns expectations about future
annuity benefits. In particular, substantial changes in Social Security
legislation took place during the sample period. Should we assume that
these were properly anticipated? If we assume myopic expectations at
each point in time (constant real benefits from that point forward),
Social Security wealth will be quite volatile. However, since by
assumption this volatility is unanticipated, resulting changes in wealth
should not be counted as saving or dissaving. in such a world, planned
dissaving from Social Security is necessarily zero by definition.
In practice, we assume that all changes in Social Security
legislation during the sample period were correctly anticipated, and
that constant real benefits were expected after 1919. This tends to
minimize changes in Social Security wealth induced by legislative
action. We also assume that government and private pensions were
expected to provide constant real and nominal benefits, respectivelyJ±.1!J
A second difficulty concerns the proper treatment of couples. The
model described above is out of its depth when household members can die
at distinct points in time. If, however, annuities have full assumption
of benefits by a surviving spouse, then our conclusion is essentially
unchanged: if the household has no bequest motive, and if its members
would never want to consume the principal of an asset, then it must be
indifferent between that asset and an annuity which pays the same income
stream. Thus, simple discounting is still appropriate, If the desire—36—
toconsume the principal will arise only far in the future, then simple
discounting must be a good approximation.
For government and private pensions, we assume full transfer of
benefits, so the difficulty dissappears. However, we know that this is
counterfactual in the case of Social Security. We resolve this dillen,ma
by decomposing Social Security into two streams: a certain stream
(equal to the minimum benefit under any survival contingency), and a
contingent stream (equal to the residual). By the preceeding argument,
simple discounting is approximately appropriate for the certain stream.
In the following analysis, we simply ignore the contingent stream. We
suspect that the insurance value associated with this contingent stream
does not change enough over time to alter any of our qualitative con-
clusions.
In Table 6,wepresent calculation of annuity wealth for the
samples described in section 2. The presentation of these numbers is
designed to facilitate comparison with the results on bequeathable
wealth.
Note that between 1969 and 1975, annuity wealth rises steeply for
most pre—retirement groups. Since pensions pay little or no income to
such individuals during this period, pension assets effectively earn
interest as the date of benefit eligibility approaches (the rise in
pension wealth is due solely to this effect; in these calculations,
continuing to work does not per se contribute to the value of
benefits). Note that this effect is not very significant for working
households between 1975 and 1979; evidently, most of these households
began to receive benefits prior to full retirement.—37—
For retired groups, annuity wealth changes very little, as
expected. During the sample period there are two countervailing
effects: legislation increases the real value of Social Security, while
inflation erodes the value of private pensions. The first effect is not
as large as one might expect, since we assume that future legislative
changes are correctly anticipated. Thus, the Social Security wealth
stream is relatively flat. Since private pensions are discounted at a
much higher rate, Social Security dominates these calculations. Never-
theless, the erosion of private pension values contributes to a slight
decline in total annuity wealth.
In Table 7, we combine data on bequeathable wealth and annuities.
Due to the size of annuities relative to bequeathable asset, the total
wealth—age profile is relatively flat. For retired single individuals,
total wealth appears to decline by at most 1% per year. In fact,
between 1969 and 1975, total wealth increased for more than half of
these households. Retired couples exhibit a slight decline (1 to 1 1/2%
annual) in total wealth during the early sample period, but show
virtually no change during the later period. In contrast, working
households show slight increases (0 to 2%) in total wealth for almost
every period and subsample. Note that the "puzzle" concerning the
precipitous decline between 1969 and 1975 in the bequeathable wealth of
late retirees now acquires a new interpretation: this dissaving simply
offset the implicit saving accompanying the approach of pension
eligibility.—38—
Contrary to King and Dicks-Mireaux, we have found that evidence of
rapid dissaving among the elderly dissapears when annuities are consid-
ered. Ourcalculationsbased on hypothetical parameter valies in a
simple life cycle model (Table 5) suggest that the data on bequeathable
and total wealth profiles (Table 3 and 7) together are consistent with a
behavioral dissaving rate of less than 2% per yearJi However, as noted
before, this does not constitute a formal test of the life cycle hypo-
thesis. In the next section, we investigate the possibility of basing a
formal test on information about the age—wealth profile.
5. Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis
While rates of dissaving may not, by themselves, confirm or refute
the life cycle hypothesis, the observed response of these rates to
involuntary annuitization may provide a basis for doing so. This
suggestion motivates the following analysis.
Returning to our formal model, let us assume that, as an approxi—
mation, we can ignore the effect of non—negativity constraints (equation
(5)). Equation (iIi) will than describe the evolution of bequeathable





Notice first that the sign of (g) is the same as that of y —g.
This simply reflects the phenomenon noted earlier: annuitiation will
accelerate (decelerate) the growth of bequeathable wealth if and only if
y >g(y <g).We illustrate this pattern in Figure 1. Suppose that
two individuals have different behavioral dissaving parameters and
but that their annuity benefit profiles have a common growth rate,
g. If >g>y2,annuitization will accelerate bequeathable wealth
accumulation for individual I, and slow it for individual 2. Proposi-
tion 2 confirms that explicit consideration of the non—negativity con-
straints does not change this conclusion.
A test based on the behavioral response of accumulation rates to
involuntary annuitization should have substantial power against IIE.jor
alternatives. The existence of an operative bequest motive would, for
example, imply that annuitization always causes bequeathable wealth to
accumulate more rapidly (decline more slowly)Ji A similar implication
is generated by more simple minded models, in which households save some
constant fraction of current income.
Next, observe that, to a first order aproximation (expanding
around g =0),
(11)
The transversality condition guarantees that the coefficient of g is
unambiguously negative (in fact, for all g <r,'(g) <0; falls as
the growth rate of annuity benefits rises). Intuitively, increasing the
value of g may shift an individual from the regime in which annuitiza—140
tionaccelerates the growthofbequeathable wealth (y >g)to the
regime in which the effect of annuitization is reversed (y <g).This
is illustrated in figure 1: for g' >> g,individual 1 belongs to
the class of consumers who respond to annuitizat ion by accumulating
wealth at a slower rate (dashed lines indicate behavioral responses
associated with an annuity benefit growth rate of g'). This implica-.
tion is, as well, presumably testable.
Ourdataon bequeathable wealth profiles, of course, only allow us
to measure discrete changes, rather than continuous rates of change. In
moving to our empirical irxp1ementation, we niist therefore begin by con-
verting (16) into its discrete analog:
(1 +y)+(g)
For reasons discussed in section 3, we prefer to use the log rate of
accumulation as our dependent variable. Since the rate is presumed




Finally,using our first order approximation of (g) (equation (iT))
and adding a stochastic error term (representing among other things, the
effects of the preceeding approximations), we produce our basic
specification:—4l—
(18) Zn wt+i/W= y+I + r)g ._.+
Givencross—sectional data on bequeathable wealth and annuities
(including the growth rate of benefits), one could estimate equation
(18), alternatively- ignoring and imposing (through a NLLS procedure) the
implicit constraints on the coefficients. The model could then be
tested by evaluating (statistically) the plausibility of these
constraints, and by examining the sign of y —rin the constrained
version. We eschew this approach for two reasons.
First, measurement error in W introduces significant spurious
correlation between the dependent and independent variables. A nxre
sophisticated estimation technique is therefore required. One could
employ a two stage procedure, instrumenting for At/Wt with
(where 't is lifetime resources). In the results reported here, we
simply substitute At/Yt for At/Wt in the basic specification.
Estimates based on instrumenting for A.t/Wt (not reported) differed
very little from these results.
Second, data on g is extremely poor. Inference of g from
successive observation of benefits received by the same individual is
subject to enormous measurement error (due to variance in reporting).
Alternatively, one might attempt to form an estimate of g based on the
proportion of benefits which are unindexed. Presumably, this is closely
related to the proprotion of benefits received from private sources
(PROP), since government pensions (including Social Security) are
indexed, while most private pensions are not. However, the accuracy ofthis estimate would be questionable, particularly since many apparently
unindexed private pensions are de facto indexed by "good will" increases
in benefits. Although one would nevertheless expect PROP and g to be
negatively correlated (due to the lack of ubiquitous indexing), the
magnitude of this correlation is unknown. The use of PROP to proxy
for g would only allow us to judge the directions of various effects,
rather than their magnitudes.
These considerations lead us to estimate the following modified
version of equation (l8):-J_1
(19) n = + + 2PROPtI
+
wherei indexes household. Rather than attempt to recover y and
r and to test parameter restrictions, we simply inspect the pattern of
coefficients. For a sample dominated by dissavers (savers), should
be negative (positive). Since PROP is negatively correlated with g,
should be positive. We will, in addition, estimate a version of
(19) where £n A •/Y. is substituted for A ./Y.. Since several t,i 1 t,i 1
levelsof approximation have been used in deriving equation (19), we
have no great attachment to any particular functional relationship; it
is therefore important to determine whether or not the signs of
estimated coefficients are sensitive to such alternative specifications.
Unfortunately, estimation of equation (19) may be contaminated by
spurious correlation between PROP and c. Individuals with large
private pensions may, for example, be atypical (wealthier, less
impatient). Alternatively, large values of PROP may reflect greater_143_
exposure to inflation risk, which would in turn have behavioral iniplica—
tions. We remedy these problems by including PROP as a separate right
hand side variable in the estimating equation:
=+A.+2PROPt." +83PROPtj
+
Ourexpectation is that the spurious effects described above will be
captured in the estimated value of 3:althoughthere are many reasons
to believe that PROP is systematically related to e, it is inich nre
difficult to explain why the partial correlation (controlling for PROP)
betweenthe interaction and error terms would be nonzero.
We estimated these specifications separately for single individuals
and couples, using t =1975and t +1=1979.The second period was
chosen so that the samples would be nre representative of typical
retirees. Results are presented in Table 8 and 9.
Consider first the regressions for single individuals (Table 8).
Specification 1 corresponds to equation (19). Referring to equation
(18), we see that the estimated intercept measures the four—year (non—
annuitized) dissaving rate. The particular value presented in Table 1
implies a yearly dissaving rate of about 6%, which is on the high end of
the estimates presented in Section 3. Since those estimates were not
corrected for annuities, this leads one to suspect that annuitization
increased the rate of accumulation for this group, contrary to our
theoretical predictions. The point estimate of the coefficient on A/Y
confirms this suspicion; however, it is estimated very imprecisely, and
a range of magnitudes entirely consistent with the theory are well_)4 it—
withina single standard deviation. Finally, we see that the coef-
ficient of PROP.A/Y is negative, and statistically significant at a high
level of confidence. This is, of course, inconsistent with the
theoretical implications outlined above.
Adding PROP to this regression (specification 2) changes none of
the qualitative conclusions, and in fact increases both the magnitude
and statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on PROP.A/Y.
Evidently, spurious correlation between PROP and c have the effect of
biasing this coefficient upwards. Notice also that the coefficient of
PROP is statistically significant——its inclusion in the regression is
warranted.
The pattern of estimates using log A/Y is only slightly different.
Although this alternative specification obscures the interpretation of
the intercept, the signs of the remaining coefficients may again be
revealing. As before, the separate effect of annuitization is estimated
very imprecisely. Furthermore, when PROP is omitted (specification 3),
the estimated coefficient of PROP.A/Y is positive, though statistically
insignificant. However, the inclusion of PROP drives this coefficient
significantly negative as before; furthermore, the inclusion of PROP
seems warranted on statistical grounds (its t—statistic is approxi—
matelyii).
Weturn now to the regressions for couples (Table 9).Theinter-
cepts in specification 1 and 2 suggest a small positive saving rate,
roughly consistent with that estimated in Section 3. While one cannot
reject the hypothesis that this term is negative, values lying within—1t5 —
twostandard deviations are consistent with, at most, a dissaving rate
of 2% per year. We remarked earlier that couples may nevertheless have
intended to dissave——the observed accumulation nay have been due
entirely to unanticipated housing price inflation during this period.
If this is so, annuitization should depress the rate of accumulation for
this group. The coefficients of A/Y reveal that exactly the opposite is
the case. While these coefficients are not statistically significant at
conventional levels, notice that these levels are surpassed by the
estimated coefficients of log A/Y in specifications 3and14•Together,
these estimates strongly suggest that annuitization increased accuniula—
tion rates for this groupJ±..J If so, there are two possibilities: either
couples are intentional net savers after retirment (which requires us to
accept somewhat implausible behavioral parameters to rescue the life
cycle model), or the response among couples of saving to annuitization
is inconsistent with life cycle motives.
Further evidence against the life cycle hypothesis is again gener-
ated by the estimated coefficients of PROP.A/Y and PROP.log A/Y. The
pattern here closely resembles that for single individuals. In three of
four specifications, the estimated parameter is negative; in two of
these it is statistically significant at conventional levels. Once
again, only specification 3 yields a point estimate consistent with
theory. However, specification 4 reveals that the omission of PROP is
unwarranted on statistical grounds.
Although we have reported relatively few regressions in this
section, our estimates were quite robust with respect to the inclusionof other potentially inortant variables. Adding age of respondent,
health,and number of living children did not, for example, substan-
tively alter anyofthe results discussed above.
6. Conclusions
If, as suggested here, the pure life cycle hypothesis fails to
accountfor savings behavior after retirement, then itis important to
determinewhether this behavior is consistent with other theories. One
possibilityis to maintain life cycle motives, while posing the problem
of wealth accumulation within a different institutional setting. in
particular, the models of Kotlikoff and Spivak [19811, and Bernheim,
Shleifer and Summers [l98] portray intergenerational transfers as a
mechanism for facilitating intrafamily exchange. Alternatively, one can
supplement the life cycle model with a traditional bequest motive.
Fortunately, these alternatives generate testable empirical iniplica—
tions. Bernheiin, Summers and Shleifer present econometric and other
evidence to support a strategic bequest motive. My ownworkin progress
(preliminary results are presented in Bernheim [19814]) considers whether
or not the data are also consistent with a model of household prefer-








These tests should not be confused with those of Feldstein [l9uIL,
1977],Feldstein and Pellechio [1979], Kotlikoff [1979], and
others who examine the effect of involuntary annuitization on
levels of bequeathable wealth holdings.
Notice that this definition does not include the value of durable
goods. It is quite likely that, as a result, the data understate
the true rate of dissaving (elderly individuals probably engage in
few purchases of new durable goods, while old goods depreciate).
The resulting bias is, however, likely to be small.
1/Ferberet al. [1969] documents a tendency for misreporting of
assets to be related to the respondent's level of wealth.
This can often be inferred from the corresponding completion
codes, or from the implausibility of recorded values.
Presumably, if an individual does not own a home, it is
straightforward to report 0.
Earned income does not exceed $1000 per year in anyyearafter
retirement.
.1! Notethat this group is not contaminated by any households which
retired in the interim.
Aware of this difficulty, Mirer re—estimates his regressions for
the subsample of individuals who are over 75 years old. Although
this does not completely eliminate the bias (in particular, many
members of this subgroup may perform significant part—time work),
and although this subsample may be dominated by outliers in the
age spectrum, the robustness of Mirer's original estimates is
suggestive.
.21Lydalland Projector and Weiss simply group together all
individuals over 65. Mirer reports that 37% of his sample is
between 65 and 67 years old.
Estimation using the 1969 wave yielded very imprecise estimates.
However, it should be noted that the coefficient on age was
slightly positive in all cases.
Note that the samples sizes here are larger than those reported in
Section 2. Since we employ cross—sectional data here, we do not










Toput it another way,theprobability of living to 70 conditional
upon surviving to 69 is higher for the average 60 year old who
actually survives to 69 than it is for the average 60 year old in
general since the latter sample includes relatively unhealthy
people with low conditional survival probabilities who are likely
to die before they reach 69.
Thesecular rise in life expectancies nay partially or completely
offset this effect.
Mirer attempts to correct only for the "cohort effect," and finds,
not surprisingly,more striking evidence of positive saving during
retirement.
Mirer's procedure, in particular, seems seriously flawed: he
regresses the ratio of net value in owner occupied housing to
total net worth on age and total net worth. Elsewhere, he
concedes that there is likely to be substantial measurement error
in net worth. This builds in a strong, spurious negative
correlation between the dependent variable and observed total net
worth (as reflected by its negative coefficient and enormous t—
statistic). Presumably, all coefficients in this regression are
then estimated inconsistently.
2J1Mirer[1979], p. 1439.
In the first sample year, NLSrespondentsare 145to59,asopposed
to 58 to 63 for the LRHS.—50—
Unfortunately,Diamond and Hausman do not report the total number
of individuals retiring during their sample period. Their regres-
sions were, however, based on approximately 1200 observations.
Assuming a uniform distribution of age, only 1400wouldhave
reached 65 by the end of the sample period. This may in part
account for the large standard error of their estimate. In con-
trast, the youngest LRHS respondent was 68 in 1979.
Diamond and Hausman's sample will overrepresent early retirees.
This may explain stich of their findings; see the comments at the
end of this section.
Since early retirees are typically poorer and less healthy, this
somewhat offsets the other effects.
It would in any case be quite difficult to produce a "typical"
sample, since the LRHSoversamplescertain groups to begin with.
Note that for the "retired in 1969" and "not retired in 1975"
samples,no value is reported for bequeathable wealth in 1979,
since we do not require household survival past 1975.
This follows from smoothing of consumption.
The net worth of workers fell by 3.14% ($2299) between 1969 and
1975, and rose by11.6%($8771) between 1975 and 1979.
In a world without annuities, wealth would evolve in this way as
long as preferences were homothetic.
The law of large numbers requires the existence of certain
moments.
The assumption of independence deserves some attention. One might
object that an individual who underreports assets in one year is
likely to do so in the next as well. This creates no problems, as
long as the fraction underreported by individual i does not
change systematically with his wealth.
Observations with larger 's will (given the same level of
initial wealth) be more likely to remain in the sample.
For example, over one—third of LIHS households retired in 1969
were single individuals; in 1975, this figure fell to one—sixth.
Thomas Gustafson has pointed out that the data presented here are
too aggregated to test this hypothesis——we cannot tell if the same
households which sell businesses and property also become new
homeowners during this period. In fact, this pattern might seem
somewhat unlikely, since households which do not own homes often—51—
have virtually no other assets. Alternatively, the rise in
average housing wealth may be primarily attributable to the
purchase of more expensive houses by those liquidating business
and other property holdings (new homeowners may have virtually no
equity). Another possibility is that individuals who move at
retirement typically discover that their current house is worth
more than expected; the decline in other assets should then be
counted as dissaving. By disaggregating the data, it should be
possible to distinguish between these possibilities. This is left
for future work.
If the rate of time preference exceeds the discount rate,
households will consume all resources immediately. If the
inequality goes the other way, the transversality condition is
violated, and no optimum exists. For equality, the household is
completely indifferent between all consutmpt ion programs that
exhaust his resources.
See Yaari [19651.
2JHouseholdsmay still hold some bequeathable wealth if annuiti—
zation occurs through the family, as suggested by Kotlikoff and
Spivak [1981]. It is, however, unclear whether one can infer
anything from rates of dissaving in the context of their model.
Implicitly, we assume that single year conditional survival
probabilities are constant over time. In such a world, the
actuarial value of an annuity does not change with age. In what
follows, it should be clear that our central results do not depend
upon this assumption. In particular, the argument which
establishes that simple discounting is approximately appropriate
depends only upon there being a relatively long interval before
the nonnegativity constraint on bequeathable wealth binds. To
take an extreme alternative, suppose death will occur at date T,
with certainty. If an annuity contract promises to pay benefits
past this date, those benefits are irrelevant. The appropriate
value of an annuity (assuming either that the individual can
borrow on benefits paid prior to T or that terminal benefits are
not too large) is then just the simple discounted value of
benefits, up to age T. In this very special case, actuarial
valuation is exactly appropriate, and our technique (which
includes benefits promised after T) is clearly in error.
However, we have added the qualification that there must be a
relatively long interval before the constraint on bequeathable
wealth binds. Here, it binds as T, so if T is large, our
method is, again, approximately appropriate. In general, however,
if there is some maximum age, one could always improve our measure
by excluding benefits promised after the maximum age.
The transversality condition guarantees this inequality.—52—
This is consistent with the calculations in the next section.
Previous studies have obtained lower estimates of annuitization
(A0/(r —g)W0)specifically because they have employed actuarial
valuation.
For elderly individuals, single year survival probabilities are
approximately 95%, so one can think of A =0.05as representing
the case where all discounting Is due to uncertain length of life.
While these calculations appear to confirm the superiority of
simple discounting as a measure of value, the reader should bear
in mind that any sample of elderly individuals may exhibit great
behavioral heterogeneity. Thus, even if simple discounting is
appropriate for the median household, it may be highly inaccurate
when applied to rapid dissavers, who will reach a binding
constraint quickly.
.2±9_IDetailsare available from the author.
If y >g,the growth of bequeathable assets accelerates with
annuitization. For this case, the non—negativity constraints
never bind, and (17) is exactly appropriate.
2±?—!Thisrequires an exceptionaly large amount of tedious algebraic
manipulation. Details are avaliable from the author.
Again, details are available from the author.
We assumed inflation rates of 6% prior to 1969, rising to 9% by
1975, and 12% by 1979, remaining constant thereafter.
While this conclusion appears warranted for the median household,
we have ignored sample heterogeneity. This is particularly
important, since rapid dissavers will reach a binding constraint
on bequeathable wealth quickly, thereby rendering the use of
simple discounting perhaps very inaccurate. Unfortunately, we
cannot distinguish behavioral heterogeneity from measurement
error.
M/'SeeBernheim [198I1 for a discussion.
Note that since PROPtI =Pt1/At1(where is private
pension benefits), PROPtI .A/Y (i.e., the
ktjtermscancell).
2±!!Thisfinding is confirmed by Diamond and Hausman [1980].—53—
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Table1
Wealth Level Regressions for 1975 Cross—Section
Singles Couples
Variable All Retired All Retired
Constant _109314 168757 31527 170171
(36359) (831L08) (37321) (118587)
Age 379 —21142 65.6 —1925
(593) (1351) (608.9) (1930)
Y O.0231 0.00892 0.0133 0.0196
(0.00514) (0.01314) (0.0035) (0.0102)













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1969 1312 120142 6172 29625
1915 9114 14srs 31401 114013
1979 ——— 141143 ——— 114966
Financial Wealth
1969 7718 5790 156514 17635
1975 146146 6509 10119 21509
1979 ——— 69149 ——— 19076
Non-Mortgage Debt
1969 1143 263 709 969
1975 153 3714 567 861
1979 ——— 192 ——— 366
' Percentowning a homeisgiven in parentheses.—59—
Table5
WealthTrajectories for Hypothetical Parameter Values*
Calculated
Parameter








* Forthese calculations, we assumed r =0.03,g =0,a =0























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SingleIndividuals, Retired by 1975
Dependent Variable:log W79/W75
Variable Specification
































Couples, Retired by 1975
Dependent Variable:log W79/W75
Variable Specification



























PROP"logA/Y ——— ——— 0.105
(o.o14)
—0.665
(0.279)